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I. INTRODUCTION
“It’s an exciting time, to be sure; but a confusing time too.”1 So
Professor Merges describes the current state of intellectual property
scholarship and policy, the backdrop to his book. Perhaps the
description could fit any endeavor in any period. As such, Professor
Merges’s search for foundations, for the essential core, is also familiar
and admirable. Whether he is the modern Odysseus or Saint Augustine,
or perhaps more appropriately a contemporary social reformer trying to
sweep aside the corruption and return to more innocent and just times,
Professor Merges has chosen a relevant and challenging project. The
result is an account of intellectual property that places ownership at the
center, but still has accommodation for the interests of nonowners, or
users. It is this account that I seek to challenge in this Article.
Identifying authors and inventors as the keystone of intellectual
property is not surprising. After all, the U.S. Constitution points in that
direction. The familiar and oft-cited Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
empowers Congress to promote progress in “Science and [the] useful
Arts” by securing exclusive rights in “Authors and Inventors.”2 Such a
command might seem justification enough in response to my impertinent
challenge to an owner-centered intellectual property law. But the
provision establishes a rule of initial vesting of rights under copyright
and patent law and tells us nothing about the scope and meaning of the
“exclusive Right[s].” In this Article, I am effectively asking whether
exclusive rights should be based exclusively, or even predominantly, on
the interests of creative people, or do what I call “users’ interests” count
as well? I argue that they do and use Professor Robert Merges’s book,
Justifying Intellectual Property, as a foil to explain why.
Professor Merges certainly believes that creative people are special.
His important and sweeping book, Justifying Intellectual Property,
develops the proposition that intellectual property rights are meant to
protect creative people and to channel their talents to the benefit of
society. He invokes Locke, Kant, and Rawls to support this point.
He uses this proposition as the linchpin for midlevel principles that
drive intellectual property policy and practice. Statistics on creative
professionals flesh out the proposition. And as for my question, what
about the rest of us, Professor Merges shows that intellectual property
rights in creative people can be channeled to serve users of digital
technologies and those unfortunate victims of fatal diseases. Intellectual

1.
2.
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property rights, in short, serve society by protecting the creative people.
So I would summarize his argument without doing the book a disservice.
Justifying Intellectual Property is an engaging book. As often is the
case with commentaries like this one, it serves to portray the book the
commentator wishes he had written. Professor Merges’s book, with its
explorations of philosophy, law, policy, and a bit of ethics, serves as a
perfect foil against which to map out the book one wishes to write. By
asking what makes creative people special, I question Professor Merges’s
proposition that creative people are the key beneficiaries of intellectual
property rights. I ask, “What about the rest of us?” to emphasize the
range of constituencies that intellectual property rights can benefit.
Professor Merges’s argument does not ignore these constituencies. At
one level, he recognizes that creativity is democratic—its presence not
based on accidents of birth or one’s station in society. Of course, some
people are more talented than others for a number of reasons. But
creativity cannot be constrained by social hierarchies or prejudices. At
another level, however, the emphasis on creative persons ignores the
broader social contexts that intellectual property rights serve. Professor
Merges identifies the social benefits that can arise potentially from
intellectual property rights. But as a servant only of creative persons,
one has to ask what other than wishful thinking will ensure that
intellectual property rights will yield benefits to all members of society
and not just the legally protected creative class.
Professor Merges overemphasizes creative persons and underemphasizes
the rest of us. My commentary is designed to correct this imbalance. To
put my point more strongly, my argument is that we should view
intellectual property law and policy as user centered, and not a balancing
of interests between creative persons and the rest of us. This argument
follows from what I hope is the uncontroversial observation that we are
all users of the intellectual property subject matter. Uses will of course
vary, and some judgment has to be made about which uses should trump.
But to engage in intellectual property policy debate fully, I argue that
intellectual property policy should center the user in the debate and
structure rights with users in mind. This Article develops this thesis,
following largely the structure of Professor Merges’s argument from
foundational principles to midlevel ones and then to practice. My goal is
to shift his argument from one centered on creative persons to one
centered on the much more broad and relevant class of users.
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This shift is not just a pedantic or academic one. A user-centered
approach to intellectual property has implications for how intellectual
property law would operate in practice through public debate and
through judicial and administrative enforcement. Shifting the focus to
users would imply conceptualizing intellectual property not in terms
of trespass, or the unauthorized crossing of a legal boundary, but in
terms of nuisance, or the conflict in use between designated owners
and purported infringers. Recognizing users of intellectual property
would not relegate this class to outlaws or pirates, but to individuals
with certain sets of interests and rights affected by private ownership.
Expanding our understanding of intellectual property would aid in
incorporating the interests and rights of users much like modern
landlord-tenant law recognizes a property right in the leasing tenant
that needs to be balanced against those of the owner. Such a
reconceptualization would correctly categorize open source licensing as
consistent with intellectual property rights managed and distributed in a
particular way. These implications will become clear as Professor Merges’s
conceptual categories are reconfigured with a user focus.
How users have been misconstrued in intellectual property law
became transparent in the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Golan v.
Holder.3 At issue in the case was Congress’s power to remove works
that had failed to obtain copyright protection in the United States from
the public domain. Congress had removed non-U.S. works from the
public domain through the restoration of copyright under section 104A
of the Copyright Act, enacted in 1994 pursuant to international treaty
obligations.4 The Supreme Court upheld Congress’s power to restore
copyright in this fashion.5 In its opinion, Justice Ginsburg, writing for a
six-Justice majority, stated that there were no vested rights in public
domain works that Congress needed to respect.6 More specifically, she
pointed out that no one has an ownership interest in public domain
works that could be the basis for injury should Congress remove works
from the public domain through copyright restoration.7 What is striking
is that this characterization of the public domain assumes that rights can
only be understood in terms of ownership. But the rights in the public
domain—the rights, effectively, of users—are not solely matters of
ownership. They constitute a set of reliance and other interests that the
courts should at least recognize in assessing whether Congress has gone

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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too far. The Court’s failed analysis in Golan stems, in part, from a
failure to understand or recognize users’ rights.
Professor Merges, despite the centrality of creative persons to his
argument, organizes a set of ideas that are conducive to refocusing
intellectual property law on users. I present this user-focused argument
in this Article through the following five Parts. Part II explains my
suggested approach to questions about the design of intellectual property
law—an approach based on the new institutional economics and the
work of Ronald Coase. Part II also addresses objections to this
approach. Part III identifies the user in Professor Merges’s high-level
principles grounded in Locke, Kant, and Rawls. Part IV follows this
argument with a closer examination of the four midlevel principles that
inform intellectual property. These midlevel principles, I argue, are
more cogent when expanded to include all users and not just creative
persons. Finally, in Part V, I make the case for including users within
the practices of intellectual property. These practices are framed in
terms of the three broad goals of any system of property rights: stability,
management, and autonomy. Part VI concludes.
II. MORAL OWNERS AND ECONOMIC USERS?
Professor Merges begins his book with an elegiac parallel between
two global cities—Mexico City and Shanghai—and intellectual property
scholarship. Like the cities, intellectual property scholarship is sprawling.
As a denizen of this sprawl, Professor Merges confesses to find himself
at a loss. He expresses nostalgia for a time when intellectual property
law and policy was simpler, more rooted in core values, and less
enmeshed in bright lights and new-fangled developments. At the same
time, Professor Merges admits dissatisfaction with the overreliance on
efficiency as the basis for gauging intellectual property policy.
Although his scholarship had been grounded in the normative principle
of efficiency, Professor Merges expresses dissatisfaction with the
principle as one to aid in answering basic questions of intellectual
property design. His book, subsequently, represents a return to
foundational principles gleaned from a study of Locke, Kant, and Rawls
to develop fundamental principles to then formulate midlevel, guiding
principles. The midlevel principles—nonremoval, dignity, efficiency,
and proportionality—ground an owner-centered intellectual property law
that accommodates the needs of users in environments such as digital
creation and access to medicines. At the end of the book, Professor
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Merges appears to have constructed a comfortable and comforting niche
in the contemporary sprawl.
I have described Professor Merges’s exploration of the foundations for
intellectual property as “soul-searching.” This description was not
intended as an insult. Introspection is a virtue, in my opinion, forcing us
to rethink assumptions and reassess research agendas. The product of
Merges’s introspection is an engaging book that asks readers to
reconsider the philosophical roots of intellectual property in a moral
rather than economic tradition. At the end, the book leaves us with a
theory justifying intellectual property ownership with limits that take
into account the interests and needs of users of intellectual property.
From Professor Merges’s perspective, the core of the intellectual
property sprawl has been identified, and sense is made of the law.
With all the exploration of canonical texts from Locke, Kant, and
Rawls, I left myself wondering how much of what Professor Merges
discovers is what he expected to find. Like any good attorney, Professor
Merges is making a case, and any case can be rebutted. The ownercentered vision of intellectual property presented in the book seems to
ignore what I claim is the central problem in contemporary intellectual
property, namely the tension between users and owners of intellectual
property. Users are a highly differentiated group including, among
others, bloggers, medical professionals, documentary filmmakers, parodists,
news commentators, fans of creative works, cultural critics, remixers,
inventors, artists, consumers, entrepreneurs, academics, and cultural
preservationists. This list is not exhaustive, but captures individuals
who need to negotiate intellectual property in pursuing their own
creative objectives, professional tasks, or ordinary life experiences.
According to Professor Merges, these varied interests are accommodated
through the four midlevel principles, particularly proportionality, with
owners at the center. My question is, why should users not be at the
center of the intellectual property system?
A user-centered intellectual property system is more pertinent to the
current intellectual property sprawl.8 Users as a group are a disparate
and incoherent lot. But a user-centered understanding of intellectual

8. See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005) (pointing out the recent growth in interest in copyright
users by copyright scholars and owners); see also EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA
K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTORS IMPROVE
THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 25–26 (2010) (making the case of how users operating outside
the law improve institutions that regulate property by making them more inclusive and
competitive); MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 105–07 (2012) (making the case for protection of derivative creations
by users of protected works).
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property is necessary precisely because the interests are so diffuse in
practice. As public choice theory teaches us, laws based on concentrated
benefits and diffuse costs tend to be skewed and subject to capture.
Such a distribution of benefits and costs describes intellectual property
with owners as beneficiaries and users as the bearers of the cost of an
intellectual property system. From an analytical purpose, and with the
goal of justifying or correcting intellectual property, a user-centered
approach might create a more balanced and normative-grounded version
of intellectual property. Users are the appropriate beneficiaries of how
the intellectual property sprawl can be managed and controlled.
Before I explain how to design a user-centered intellectual property,
let me address the big question of why this recentering matters. Of
course, Professor Merges cares about intellectual property users, as his
chapters on digital technologies and access to medicine show. But his
recognition of users’ interests is developed as a cloud over owners’
rights based on principles of proportionality and charity. Waiver of
owners’ rights is a critical means through which users’ interests are
realized. One may ask why users should rely on the kindness of owners.
As a practical matter, can users rely on owners?
Furthermore, in critical areas of intellectual property debate, a focus
on owners rather than on users can have implications for policy. For
example, one current debate is the scope of patentable subject matter.
Should certain types of inventions, such as business methods or medical
diagnostics, be the subjects of patent? An owner-centered approach may
bias this debate toward recognizing property rights, allowing for
exceptions. A user-centered approach may ask us to question whether
property rights should be recognized in the first instance and provide
grounds for recognizing limitations in the scope of any right that is
recognized. In short, where one ends up may depend largely on where
one starts. In the spirit of introspection, it is worth examining these
unstated assumptions.
What I suggest is that an approach based on the new institutional
economics, with its roots in the work of Ronald Coase,9 can provide a
basis for recentering users in the design of intellectual property law.
Perhaps it is obtuse of me to suggest an economic answer when
Professor Merges’s book is based on the questioning of economics.
9. See generally R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET,
(collecting Coase’s seminal articles on legal and market theory).

AND THE

LAW (1988)
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Reconciling this paradox requires understanding Merges’s rejection as
one of wealth maximization as a basis for intellectual property policy.
Instead, Professor Merges turns to philosophy.10 The problem with this
philosophical turn is that it potentially ignores the political, social,
economic, and cultural contexts within which intellectual property
operates. But if, as Professor Merges claims, the goal is to address an
intellectual sprawl, one needs a map that provides some topographical
contours that can make the sprawl reconcilable. Otherwise, one replaces
a lived-in world with a fantasy. New institutional economics with its
focus on comparing different institutional structures provides such an
approach.11 The methodology can be used with several different normative
frameworks and does not necessarily rest on wealth maximization. An
explanation of how the new institutional economics works and applies to
intellectual property design will make these points clearer.
A. Coasean Roadmap to the Intellectual Property Sprawl
In this subpart, I describe the new institutional economics whose roots
are in the writing of Ronald Coase and propose an application to
intellectual property. I present the design of intellectual property
institutions as a problem of comparative institutional choices and show
how an institutional economic approach can guide those choices.
Ronald Coase is associated with the Coase Theorem and with
transaction cost minimization as the principle for designing legal rules.
But a more fundamental insight informs these two more familiar results
as well as an understanding of intellectual property. In his article, The
Problem of Social Cost, Coase addressed the familiar problem of negative
externalities, or costs imposed on society by private decisionmaking.12
One solution to this problem is to internalize the costs, through taxes or
penalties, so that the private decisionmaker accounts for the social costs
in his or her actions. Coase’s insight was one of reciprocal harms.
Drawing on examples from the law of nuisance, he posited that what we

10. See MERGES, supra note 1, at 20–21 (describing the book’s explorations into the
foundations of property theory).
11. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 75–77 (2009) (distinguishing between
theories of justice that build on institutions as ideals and those that build on actual
institutions). For perspectives on institutions, see THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 101–03 (1990), which presents institutional analysis as
applied to disputes over use, and ROBERT H. FRANK, THE DARWIN ECONOMY: LIBERTY,
COMPETITION, AND THE COMMON GOOD 85–87 (2011), which explains how Coase’s ideas
support a cooperative solution to competitive problems through transactions and coordinating
conflicting uses.
12. See R. H. COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND
THE LAW, supra note 9, at 95.
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see as negative externalities are conflicts over use.13 For example, the
pollution from a factory that harms a residential neighborhood is
conceptually a problem of conflicting uses, with the factory owner
wanting to pursue industrial uses and the homeowners wanting to pursue
residential ones. In resolving nuisance cases, courts ask which of these
conflicting uses should trump the other. Legal rules create rights that
resolve this dispute between competing uses in order to further goals.
These legal rights serve to allocate the social costs among the parties
based on some normative principle.
I have presented Coase’s result on reciprocity in general terms. Often,
this description leads to the conclusion that under certain conditions,
parties to a dispute over use can negotiate to the correct result
irrespective of how the law sets the legal entitlements.14 As Coase pointed
out, this irrelevance of legal entitlements is true only if all transacting is
costless.15 This point serves as the basis for another formulation of the
Coase Theorem: legal entitlements should be set to minimize transaction
costs. In related work, I showed with coauthor David Driesen that a
transaction cost minimization formulation is misleading because it
ignores features of the environment in which actors operate and
specifically can ignore transaction benefits.16 In other words, in some
situations, we may not want the parties to transact and so transaction
costs can prevent undesirable transactions. However, none of these
complications detract from the underlying observation that many social
disputes involve conflicts over use rather than one party clearly and
unilaterally causing harm to another.
Professor Lee Anne Fennell provides a criticism of how scholars have
based property rights on transaction costs in a forthcoming article.17 Her
criticism has parallels with the argument of this Article that are worth
pointing out even though I cannot develop those parallels fully here.
Professor Fennell argues that transaction costs are ill-defined and instead
offers the concept of “resource access costs” as a more coherent and

13. See id.
14. Id. at 98–99.
15. Id. at 119.
16. David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs:
Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61,
103–10 (2005).
17. Lee Anne Fennell, Resource Access Costs, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154069.
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tractable alternative.18 Resource access costs represent the cost of
accessing and transferring assets and reflect the goal of property rights
as “a way of structuring access by designating an owner who has a
specified set of rights and enjoys a residual claim on the asset.”19 As I
understand Professor Fennell’s argument, this Article illustrates how
intellectual property rights are defined in order to reduce access costs
and thereby benefit users.
The reciprocity principle applies to intellectual property as well. In
many disputes over intellectual property, the owner of intellectual
property claims that a third party is infringing a protected work. The
legal claim is based on the alleged infringer either appropriating a
benefit from the owner—free riding—or injuring the owner by usurping
profit or market share. The owner’s claim of right permits an injunction
or a claim of damages against the infringer unless special circumstances
arise or the owner waives the claims. A reciprocal approach, however,
would frame the problem in terms of conflicting uses over the work. For
example, the designated owner would want to make her own movie from
a copyrighted novel, while the alleged infringer wants to make his own
movie based on the same novel. Often, the owner might tell the alleged
infringer to create his own original novel and make a movie from that
original work. Under the reciprocal approach, the alleged infringer
might respond that the owner should create her own movie and let him
be. Intellectual property law attempts to resolve this conflict over use by
structuring legal entitlements. The question I am posing is, why should
this conflict be weighed in favor of the owner rather than the so-called
infringer? The labeled infringer in this case is an example of what I call
a user.
At this point in my argument, I am reframing the problem. There are
several objections to my claim, which I address in the next subpart.
Here, let me object to one that I address in more detail below. The
analogy to nuisance in real property, which provides the basis for
Coase’s discussion of reciprocal harms, may seem inapposite to the
intellectual property problem. At issue for intellectual property is the
creation of new works. I call this the ex nihilo condition to emphasize
that the subject matter of the dispute comes out of nothing. By contrast,
the subject of dispute, the use of the land, already exists in nuisance
cases. Therefore, the contention is the conception of reciprocal harms
may be applicable to works that have been created but does not offer

18.
19.
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guidance in whether works would be created in the first place. How,
critics would ask, do I address the ex nihilo condition?
There are three responses. First, the ex nihilo condition applies to
users as well. If someone wants to create or invent a new work based on
something that is copyrighted or patented, this new work is also subject
to the ex nihilo condition. The solution may be to obtain a license from
the intellectual property owner. But that response begs the question,
why should the owner’s claim to a new work trump any claims by a
creative or inventive user? To use the language of the law, what
conditions would support the creation of derivative works or
improvements? The last two are also subject to the ex nihilo condition.
Licensing is of course one response, but that privileges owners over
users. We are therefore in a condition of reciprocity, as described by
Coase.
Furthermore, the conception of reciprocal harms applies outside the
creation of derivative works and improvements to the creation of
original works. The conflict over use that is at the heart of intellectual
property appears in the decision whether to make a work in the first
instance. Consider two individuals. One wants to make movies and
television programs. The other wants to make a technology that can
copy these works perfectly. These two plans are in conflict. How do we
resolve the conflict? One objection is that I have shifted away from the
problem of conflicting uses of a thing, like land, to conflicting plans, a
shift that seems very different from the classic nuisance case. But the
creation of new works and technologies does require inputs and resources,
and we can recast the conflicting plans over seemingly irreconcilable
uses of resources. For example, both the making of movies and of
technologies to copy movies require comparable recording and storage
equipment. The conflict is the use to which these resources should be
put when we need to choose between uses that influence each other.
Finally, the ex nihilo condition is not unique to intellectual property.
Although land is not manufactured or created, conflicts over real
property have to do with the divergent uses to which land is put.
A shopping mall, a housing project, a school, an airport—each is created
ex nihilo. In resolving a dispute over conflicting uses, the effects of
different entitlements on the creation of these tangible works are often
taken into consideration. There is no reason why the ex nihilo condition
could not similarly be adapted to conceptualizing intellectual property in
reciprocal terms. The existence of a physical resource like land strikes
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me as misleading. Nuisance disputes are often precisely about conflicting
plans and visions that are translated into the practical terms of reconciling
conflicting uses.20 I propose a similar approach to intellectual property.
Why does this conceptualization matter and what are its implications?
The conceptualization matters because it allows for a more careful
consideration of the interests of users without displacing concerns for
owners. It permits precisely a more structured balancing of interests that
intellectual property law purports to establish. Its implications also
permit a type of methodological and normative heterogeneity to the
intellectual property debate. Careful and sympathetic readers may
conclude that my Coasean rendition of intellectual property would lead
to the transaction cost minimization rationale for policy that we see in
the various versions of the Coase Theorem. Such readers would also be
familiar with Wendy Gordon’s work on fair use.21 Professor Gordon
argues that fair use in copyright serves to allow uses to occur when the
transaction costs of licensing are too high. A criticism of this
pathbreaking work is that it leaves open the question of situations when
fair use should be allowed even though licensing is possible.22 For
reasons I present in a separate article,23 I am hesitant to adopt transaction
cost minimization as a response to the problem of reciprocity.
Instead, I propose that recognizing reciprocity leads to addressing
problems through comparative institutional analysis. As with any idea,
there are many variants, but I propose one that asks policymakers to
design intellectual property laws not based on claims of right of either
owners or users, but on the consequences of institutional design for both
owners and users. Although this may seem like a daunting task, I am
eschewing what could be called global consequentialism. To put the
point concisely, I do not think one has to know everything in order to
conclude anything. Instead, comparative institutional analysis calls for a
pragmatic approach, one not based on moral conceptions of rights, but
on identifying legal entitlements within social, political, and economic
contexts.
The roots of comparative institutional analysis can be traced to Coase
in his article on social costs. But the approach has fuller expression in

20. See generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of
Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004).
21. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600
(1982).
22. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 576–77 (1996).
23. See Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 16, at 64 (suggesting that reducing transaction
costs risks reducing the benefits that these costs purchase).
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his article on lighthouses.24 This short article addressed the institutional
arrangements surrounding lighthouses in England, particularly the
choice of the correct blend of government regulation and private
governance.25 What is important about the article is its approach. Coase
asks questions about institutional design and adopts a comparative
framework, examining the implications of alternative arrangements for
ownership and management of lighthouses. It is that mindset that is
instructive for structuring legal entitlements, such as intellectual property.
What I propose seems to place quite a burden on judges, legislators,
and other actors in the legal system. I am of course not advocating that
every legal dispute involve complex, academic comparisons of alternative
institutions and their consequences. Instead, the shift I propose would
lend itself to the types of arguments and evidence that the legal
decisionmaker can consider in reaching a decision. An approach that
would be based on ownership, particularly the value of labor used to
create a work, countenances certain pieces of evidence and would find
others—perhaps the uses of the work—irrelevant. Comparative
institutional analysis expands the domain of arguments and relevant
facts and how such arguments and facts are assessed.
A recent example of what I am suggesting is provided by the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc.26 In this case, the Court invalidated a patent on a
medical diagnostic method because it was deemed to be a law of
nature.27 Ostensibly, the Court reasoned that the invention at issue was
simply a natural law rather than an innovative application of a law.28
One can argue with the Court’s characterization of the invention at issue
as a law of nature and whether laws of nature actually exist. Arguably,
the characterization served as a convenient hook for the Court to justify
its unanimous decision. What may have been more salient to the Court
were the consequences of this patent for the practice of medicine. In
fact, the Court quite prominently cites the amicus brief from the
American Medical Association challenging the patent.29

24.

See R. H. COASE, The Lighthouse in Economics, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET,
supra note 9, at 187.
Id.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
Id. at 1294.
See id.
See id. at 1304.
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25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
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Under a purely Lockean justification for patents, the Court’s inquiry
into the consequences for doctors would be irrelevant. The law of nature
inquiry would be relevant to check whether the inventor had taken too
much from the commons of knowledge. But that inquiry would still
require demarcating some baseline to ascertain what is “too much.”
Professor Merges’s notion of proportionality might be relevant to this
point, but that would entail considering consequences for users, as I
suggest. I would suggest that what the Court actually did in Mayo was a
pragmatic application of comparative institutional analysis to determine
the consequences of allowing the specific patent for the practice of
doctors. The comparative institutional analysis not only makes the
effects on medical practitioners relevant but also focuses attention on the
relevant consequences of allowing the patent.
What is missing here is an overarching normative framework for
analysis. I think Coase was silent on this point, although I read him as a
libertarian who would be skeptical of institutions that unduly restricted
economic liberty.30 In my mind, this normative flexibility is the attraction
of comparative institutional analysis. The approach allows us to focus
on consequences but does not commit us to particular normative ends.
The problem becomes one of how to assess consequences. In my view,
that assessment will be highly context dependent. In the Mayo case, the
Court was concerned with the preemptive effect of the invention on
medical practice.31 The invention did not enable anything new while
potentially foreclosing traditional practice. This type of pragmatic
application and consideration is what makes comparative institutional
analysis desirable.
With this description of comparative institutional analysis in hand,
I turn next to several objections to my argument. There are four
principal objections. First, my argument does not address the ex nihilo
condition. Second, comparative institutional analysis is inconsistent
with commonsense notions of morality and potentially leads to
undesirable consequences. Third, the reciprocity conception subsumes the
individual into a pure social construction. Fourth, there is a hidden
normative agenda to comparative institutional analysis that my pragmatic
justifications ignore. After addressing each criticism, I return to the
impetus for this inquiry, Professor Merges’s dissatisfaction with the

30. See R. H. COASE, ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 61–62 (1994)
(discussing the role of economics in public policy and pointing to studies on the negative
effects of government regulation).
31. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94 (expressing concern with patents that
preempt application of a natural law or natural correlation in medical diagnostic and
therapeutic contexts).
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contemporary sprawl of intellectual property. I conclude by suggesting
why the approach I present takes us to the heart of the sprawl without
getting us lost in a heart of darkness.
B. Global Positioning of the Roadmap: The Objections
In this subpart, I address four salient objections to my argument that
intellectual property entails a conflict over use. Addressing these objections
serves to strengthen and develop my arguments, as well as establish
some foundational points that will arise in subsequent Parts of the
Article. The four objections are: (1) focusing on conflicting use ignores
the ex nihilo condition; (2) focusing on conflicting use ignores and
diminishes moral claims of right; (3) focusing on conflicting use ignores
the individual; (4) focusing on use as supporting a plurality of normative
positions ignores the hidden normativity of Coase and comparative
institutional analysis. I address each point in turn.
1. The Ex Nihilo Condition
Intellectual property’s appeal follows from its goal of creating new
works. Whether couched in terms of innovation, progress, creation,
invention, or originality, intellectual property is salient precisely because
it supports what did not exist before. The strength of intellectual
property supports, in many instances, claims by the intellectual property
owner to limit or even deny access. The tenor of these claims is as
follows. Because the owner brought the works into existence, potential
users are not denied anything they otherwise did not have. A fortiori,
absent any harmful effects from the new product or service, individuals
are made better off than they were before. Therefore, to the extent
intellectual property promotes new products or services that did not exist
before, intellectual property is welfare enhancing.
I have called this type of argument the “reverse precautionary
principle.”32 Just as the precautionary effect supports regulation to prevent
any potential harm, the reverse precautionary principle supports any
intellectual property right as long as there is a potential benefit. I have
argued that this principle overstates the case for intellectual property.33
I would make the same case for the ex nihilo condition. Those who
32.
33.

Shubha Ghosh, Why Intergenerational Equity, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 103, 104–06.
Id. at 104.
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subscribe to the ex nihilo condition, the argument that intellectual
property permits that which would otherwise not exist, need to make the
case why creating something out of nothing grants owners a trumping
claim over users with some possible exceptions. There are three problems
with using the ex nihilo condition to support the primacy of ownership:
(1) the well-studied problem of romantic authorship; (2) the process of
creation and invention; and (3) the source of value in intellectual
property.
Ex nihilo arguments parallel those of the romantic author.34 The latter
is culturally based, grounded in nineteenth-century conceptions of the
creative genius or the value-creating and productive entrepreneur.
Although the main criticism of the romantic author notion is that
authorship is socially constructed and creation and invention are social
processes, not just individual ones, the flaw with the ex nihilo argument
is that producing something out of nothing does not inexorably lead to
strong property rights. Discovering new territory, new natural resources,
new waterways, a new plant, or a new mathematical concept are each
examples of ex nihilo creation, but different legal regimes of ownership
govern each situation. For new territory, national sovereignty trumps
individual discovery. Natural resources and waterways have their own
rules for capture and ownership. New plants can be the subjects of
intellectual property, but new mathematical concepts are less likely to be
granted protection. One should ask why the appeal of newness should
lead to strong ownership rights for intellectual property. Follow-on
inventions and improvements often relax claims by the intellectual
property owner. My suggestion is that some principle other than simply
producing something out of nothing must be guiding the definition of
property rights.
A potential guiding principle may come from an understanding of the
process of creation and invention. One does not have to indulge too
deeply in the social construction of authorship and inventorship to
ponder whether any work truly is made from nothing. Contemporary
mechanical and electronic inventions include the applications of
established and newly discovered scientific principles. New machines
and processes evolve from old ones through acts, often unpredictable, of
34. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 54–57 (1996); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE
CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE
LAW 219 (1998); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a
Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1322–27 (1996); Peter Jaszi
& Martha Woodmansee, Introduction to THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL
APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 1, 10–13 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi
eds., 1994).
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human ingenuity. New works build on old, established themes reworked
and reshaped through creative energies. These arguments can be readily
reduced to saying there is nothing new under the sun. But such a handy
shibboleth ignores the deeper point. Of course The Lord of the Rings or
To the Lighthouse are not inherently present in the Roman alphabet and
rules of English grammar, nor is it meaningful to say glibly that the iPad
existed in weaving looms. It is the energy and the shaping of these
previous elements that creates the new item, and the new item in turn
serves as raw material for future works. The ex nihilo argument glorifies
the work and product and deflects our attention from the creative
energies that produce them.
Refocusing attention on creative energies is important for the third
reason that one should be skeptical of the ex nihilo argument. The
source of value, both economic and social, comes from the use to which
new works and products are put.35 The new, new thing may wow us, but
ultimately if the newness does not translate into concrete benefits,
whether realized as gains in productivity, contributions to knowledge, or
stimulation of entertainment and pleasure, then it is hard to say whether
the new, new thing is really valuable. Of course, proponents of the ex
nihilo argument will say that these benefits are meaningless and pointless if
the creation never occurs. But that misses the point. Nowhere am I
suggesting that creation is bad or that it should be discouraged. My
contention is that use contributes to value rather than mere ownership.
The goal of intellectual property ultimately is to promote use. Of course,
ownership is important for that goal, but it would be wrong to say that
ownership is primary.

35. This statement reflects in part the criticism of the coherence of the labor theory
of value, which has its roots in Locke. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in
Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939,
955–56 (1985). The labor theory of value was sharply criticized and rejected in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and replaced with a theory of market exchange as the
determination of economic value. See, e.g., ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
526 (8th ed. 1920). With the development of technologically-driven markets based on
the flow of communication and information, the understanding of markets has shifted to
a focus on knowledge creation and exchange. See, e.g., DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF
POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING, at xvii (spec. anniversary
ed. 1999) (describing a knowledge theory of value in contrast with a labor theory). The
importance of use, particularly collaborative use, is now the focus of understanding markets
based on networks of information and individuals. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM
(2006).
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A summary of my criticism of the ex nihilo condition reveals the fault
lines. I contend that the ex nihilo argument creates a false dichotomy
between ownership and use. This false dichotomy is false because it
leads to ownership trumping use in most instances. The dichotomy leads to
the reverse precautionary principle referenced above. Furthermore,
I call the dichotomy false because owners are a type of user. The works
they create, the innovations they make, entail using the materials for
creativity and innovation: scientific principles, linguistic forms, spatial
relationships, cultural allusions, which properly reconstituted through
individual energy lead to the new, new thing. If owners are recognized
as a type of user, not only is the ex nihilo condition minimized, but the
case for intellectual property under a comparative institutional analysis
is also strengthened.
2. Immoral?
By reducing all disputes to one of conflict between equally competing
claims of use, the approach I endorse seemingly minimizes moral
claims. Not only is the moral claim of the owner, whose talents and
efforts have borne fruit, minimized, but also the claim of a person whose
private information is misappropriated as a violation of any rights of
privacy. To take my conception to the logical extreme, rape is simply a
matter of convenience with the lust and violence of the rapist seemingly
being on the same plane as that of the brutalized. These objections were
raised by the attendees at the Law and Philosophy conference in San
Diego where I presented a draft of this Article. These objections are a
reaction to the seeming nihilism and moral neutrality of the comparative
institutional analysis. I believe they overstate the claims of comparative
institutional analysis and present all moral claims as absolutes that
themselves need not be defended.
To start with the third and most trenchant criticism first, there is
nothing about my argument that would support rape or other acts of
assault. My argument is about intellectual property. One could just as
readily make the contention that Lockean theories of property support
treating people as chattel. That leap would entail a category mistake, in
my opinion, with the conclusion that x is property resting on the
assumption that anything is potentially property. More to the point, my
argument generalizes to transactional environments. Personal relationships,
particularly intimate ones, are not transactional. They are not the
product of monetary or even reciprocal gift exchanges. Whether there is
a deeper moral basis for claims against physical violence I leave for
another inquiry. I do not think anything in my argument would
undermine such independent moral bases.
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Related to the intellectual property context is the second objection,
that my reciprocity of harms approach would ignore values such as
protection of privacy. Consider the following example. Suppose
someone without permission peers into someone’s bedroom window and
takes a nude picture of the resident. The nude picture is published on the
Internet. Perhaps the nude picture reveals some publicly important
information about the resident. Presumably, under my reciprocity of
harms approach, any basis for liability would entail an analysis of the
consequences for the world if some conduct were allowed as compared
to consequences if the conduct were forbidden. Such an analysis,
however, would ignore any moral claims that the photographed would
have to be free of intrusion. The photographer as user of the information
would have a claim to the activity that common decency would view as
intrusive and invasive of personal interests. Put another way, any moral
claim would be trumped by utilitarian-like claims that the user is
creating value and therefore should prevail.
This criticism overstates the claim. A comparative institutional approach
does not eschew moral claims. The approach asks that such moral
claims be justified. Under the comparative institutional approach, the
justification is based on consequences for institutions, within which we
must operate. If anyone were allowed to photograph inside someone’s
residence, then everyone or at least a large majority of people would do
so. Such human activities would divert from other, more socially
valuable activities and would create incentives for residents to block access
to potential paparazzi. The opposite rule forbidding such intrusive
photographing may have less costly consequences. A more difficult
problem arises with respect to the publication of the photograph once
taken. Although the inclination would be to not recognize rights in
photographs that were intrusively procured, there is a competing moral
claim of the right to know. The moral claims of privacy and freedom of
expression would at some level have to be reconciled. Comparative
institutional analysis may offer one solution. The point is that morality
alone cannot answer tough questions. More importantly, moral claims
themselves have to be justified.
The last point is true for the first criticism, that the approach I propose
seemingly ignores any moral claims of ownership. Once again, such
moral claims would have to be justified, and comparative institutional
analysis provides one way. The problem one potentially confronts with
my argument is that the approach does not invite stability or
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predictability. Tomorrow’s analysis might support the most outrageous
of institutional arrangements, centralized planning, authoritarianism, or
slavery. Comparative institutional analysis, one might argue, makes
anything up for grabs and is too contextualized and relative.
Such consequences for comparative institutional analysis seem an
overreaction. The point of comparative institutional analysis is to
recognize the choices we might make. The approach is pragmatic and
empirically based. The actual consequences that are known of centralized
planning, authoritarianism, slavery, and other objectionable institutional
arrangements are arguments in themselves for not repeating them. They
are, as a matter of painful experience, off the table. More to the point,
these offensive arrangements were often justified with an unexamined
and unquestioned morality. Comparative institutional analysis is not
immoral or even amoral, but it does ask us to justify the choices we
make based upon moral claims and thereby provides a sure, more
conscious recognition of their merits.
3. Losing the Individual?
Ownership has its power in a story of individualism. Property rights
reflect respect for the individual as creator, manager, and entrepreneur.
By contrast, a comparative institutional approach seemingly places
institutions above the individual and reduces individuals to either social
constructs or a set of interests that can give way to competing social
demands and needs. Consequently, the values of individual autonomy
and decisionmaking are swept away.
Once again, this argument proves too much. Some of its prongs
appear in my discussion of autonomy as a midlevel principle in Part III.
At the outset, one needs to recognize that much intellectual property
ownership is collective and not individual. Standard assignment terms
in employment contracts transfer intellectual property rights into the
hands of the employer, often a business entity like a corporation. Under
the “work made for hire” doctrine in copyright law, such contractual
transfers are bypassed altogether by vesting ownership in the business
entity as employer directly. Equating ownership with individual merit or
desert ignores the realities of collective ownership.
Often, intellectual property battles pit individuals against other
individuals. The nature of intellectual property litigation is not holding
intellectual property ownership at the sufferance of the public, but to the
interests of individual users. Admittedly, these individual users may be
surrogates for broader public interests, such as universities or libraries.
Realities of intellectual property litigation are competing private claims.
Comparative institutional analysis confronts these realities. As opposed

998

[VOL. 49: 979, 2012]

Managing the IP Sprawl
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

to privileging a public claim against that of an owner, comparative
institutional analysis seeks to compare competing sets of entitlements to
structure institutions within which individual creation and transaction
can occur. If anything, comparative institutional analysis would support
individualism rather than subvert it.
The problem that leads to this criticism is that I have described users
as an undifferentiated entity when in fact the term captures a range of
differentiated and diverse interests. To speak of users as a collectivity
ignores the individual differences within the designated class. But one
needs some term, and the advantage of the term users is that it even
subsumes owners and provides an avenue for identifying convergent
interests in the design of intellectual property law. But that problem of
terminology does not subsume the individual into a collectivity. Instead,
it asks us to recognize the range of individual interests beyond those of
owners that intellectual property affects. If anything, the approach I
propose is hyperindividualistic by seeing beyond owners as the primary
set of individuals that matter for the design of intellectual property law.
4. Hidden Normativity?
I have made the claim that comparative institutional analysis may
support a range of normative judgments about intellectual property. The
criticism is that with its focus on a transactional environment,
comparative institutional analysis is really just a disguised form of
wealth maximization.36 This conclusion follows from the approach’s
roots in Coase, whose work focused on the minimization of transaction
costs. The sole goal of minimizing transaction costs is to maximize
social wealth. Furthermore, not only is comparative institutional analysis a
disguised form of wealth maximization, but it is also antithetical to
distributional concerns or issues of justice.
This criticism would reject any claim that comparative institutional
analysis is a form of positive analysis, devoid of normative claims. I too
would reject a facile separation of positive and normative analysis. All
analysis entails judgment in terms of framing that inevitably reflects
normative choices. Certainly an application of comparative institutional
analysis would also introduce a blend of positive analysis with
36. See, e.g., Noah Popp, Wealth Versus Welfare: Correcting for the Marginal Utility
of Wealth in Assigning Private Law Entitlements, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 69, 78–79
(2011).
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normative prescription. Where I would begin to differ is in equating
comparative institutional analysis with wealth maximization. Coase
himself was critical of wealth maximization. His writings reveal a
libertarian streak with an emphasis on maximizing human freedom,
particularly the freedom to transact. Other scholars display a range of
normative commitments from wealth maximization to questions of
distributional justice.37 The beauty of comparative institutional analysis
is that it forces the scholar or policymaker adopting its approach to think
critically and analytically about institutional design and its consequences.
The relevant consequences are where normative choices enter. Instead
of predetermining normative commitments, the approach invites a range
of normative commitments and the need for persuasion, communication,
and dialogue to choose among them.
Many of the criticisms of comparative institutional analysis will arise
in various parts of this Article. For the rest of my discussion, I will
focus on the need to understand users’ rights with the comparative
institutional analysis as the background approach. The discussion that
follows in Parts III, IV, and V recenters the user in intellectual property
law by using Professor Merges’s analytical approach as a foil. This Part
provides some background and foundation as context for my broader
argument.
C. At the Heart of the Sprawl
Professor Merges’s trepidation of intellectual property reveals a
paradox. He feels that during his career as an intellectual property
scholar, the field has grown into a sprawl and he waxes nostalgic for the
good old days. However, intellectual property at its heart is about
change. The paradox is that a scholar of change is seemingly troubled
by the fruits of change. Progress promised by intellectual property has
no set boundaries. Like Darwin’s theory of evolution, it is not teleological.
Professor Merges’s doubts perhaps stem from this lack of teleology.
Consequently, he turns from the value-neutral goal of wealth
maximization to the moral roots of property as a more certain grounds
for structuring intellectual property law. The result is a design of
intellectual property institutions that emphasizes ownership with the
interests of users recognized as limitations.

37. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 4–5 (1994) (critiquing a pure goals-oriented approach
of Coasean analysis and suggesting that the method is consistent with many normative goals
other than wealth maximization).
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I have no anodyne for Professor Merges’s concerns with intellectual
property’s progress. Like many scholars, I am concerned about
intellectual property and the progress it promises. I see the sprawl and
feel not nostalgia but concerns for the future, not a fictional future of
lives not in being, but the future of the living. As a result, I have
developed an understanding of intellectual property law and policy that
asks policymakers and scholars to focus on consequences for alternative
institutional arrangements. My contention is this approach offers a
pragmatic solution to managing the intellectual property sprawl. The
rest of this Article develops these points by using Professor Merges’s
argument as a foil to make the case for an intellectual property law
centered on users rather than owners.
III. STATE OF NATURE, VEIL OF IGNORANCE, AND USERS
Justifying Intellectual Property is divided into three parts. The first
details the most basic principles that provide the foundation for
intellectual property. Grounded in the ideas of John Locke, Immanuel
Kant, and John Rawls, these principles support—somewhat loosely—
four midlevel principles that guide the implementation of intellectual
property law. These four principles are proportionality, efficiency,
nonremoval, and dignity. Finally, the foundational and midlevel
principles have implications for intellectual property policy and practice,
specifically for the role of what Professor Merges calls the creative
personal, for the use of digital materials, and for the distribution of lifesaving pharmaceuticals. In this Article, I follow the broad contours of
the book in developing my recentering of the book’s thesis on users,
rather than what I would describe as the elusive figure of the creative
person. This Part addresses the foundational principles, with the
midlevel principles and practices being the focus of Parts IV and V,
respectively.
A. Stewardship, Not Only Ownership
At the heart of Professor Merges’s justification for intellectual
property is a rejection of wealth maximization as an efficiency-based
rationale for intellectual property policy. His criticism of wealth
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maximization is a standard one. Echoing George Priest,38 Professor
Merges points to the lack of empirical support for intellectual property
rules promoting the maximization of wealth. Furthermore, wealth
maximization ignores the values captured by moral rights, inherent value
in the integrity of the work, and the personality of the author. A related
criticism is that wealth maximization is not an adequate filter for
choosing among intellectual property policies. Because intellectual
property law promotes the creation of new works and products, and new
works and products by definition increase wealth, absent negative
externalities, the criterion of wealth maximization, uncritically applied,
favors the expansion of intellectual property rights at the expense of
other values, including the rights of users.
Recognizing the limits of wealth maximization leads to a rights-based,
or deontic, justification for intellectual property. Property rights in
creative or inventive output vested in creators serve to promote the
creation of new works, which benefits society as a whole. As a
justification for intellectual property, this rationale has descriptive
appeal. Professor Merges argues that it also has normative appeal,
providing a means to define the scope of intellectual property rights in
order to yield social benefits. In response to critics of intellectual
property rights who advocate legal reform in favor of constructing a
commons of knowledge and information, Professor Merges’s response is
more than the clichéd “mend it, don’t end it.”39 Instead he develops a
sophisticated analysis of property rights grounded in Lockean notions of
property, Kantian conceptions of autonomy, and Rawlsian takes on
distributive justice. The pieces fit together, but there is an ad hoc quality
to the argument. Professor Merges takes ideas and pieces them together
into a theory of intellectual property. But, of course, one may disagree
with the pieces selected and their arrangement and coordination.
At the outset, I should emphasize that at a very broad level, I agree
completely with Professor Merges’s argument, particularly his socialjustice-oriented conclusions. But there is a bit of wishful thinking in the
argument. The foundational principles do not inevitably lead to the
conclusions that he suggests. One needs to be wary of their potential
weak joints and the vulnerabilities in structuring policy. Merges’s
starting point is John Locke and his use of the state of nature as the
origination story for property rights.40 According to this story, property

38. See George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual
Property: Comment on Cheung, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 19, 19 (1986).
39. See MERGES, supra note 1, at 32–33 (examining the “goodness of fit” between
Locke and intellectual property law).
40. See id.
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rights originated during a period before the establishment of civil society
when individuals appropriated objects in the external world by
applying—or mixing—their labor with the objects in the world. Labor is
the source of property rights, which civil society, once established,
protects according to several provisos that govern the scope of property
rights. These provisos are that of nonspoilation, sufficiency, and charity.
I discuss these provisos in the next subpart.41
The vulnerability in building on Locke lies in the strength of the
origination story. Although closely aligned to a Christian origination
story, Locke’s position nonetheless might have universal appeal.42 The
problem is that using Christian roots—which may have been a rhetorical
ploy—frames the story of property incorrectly. Property rights did not
arise from the relationship between a human subject and material objects
in a natural state. Such a story assumes that man exists outside of nature
or in some intermediate state between the natural and social world. Such
a story takes Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe as its starting point.43
Locke’s appeal to American intellectuals stems from the story’s appeal
for the settlement of the New World. Property rights, however, are
arguably more appropriate for our understanding of the relationship
among people in whatever social organizations and arrangements
humans have devised. A more appropriate analogy is not to Robinson
Crusoe but to Daniel Defoe’s The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the
Famous Moll Flanders, a story about a woman who survives and rises
through the social ranks.44 Property rights are about social relationships,
and of course relationships with material objects are part of this broader
story.
This distinction as to the origination story matters for the baseline
against which we assess and build intellectual property institutions. The
41. See infra Part III.B.
42. See, e.g., Steven Menashi, Cain as His Brother’s Keeper: Property Rights and
Christian Doctrine in Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, 42 SETON HALL L. REV.
185, 267 & n.465 (2012) (analyzing the relationship between Locke’s theory of property
rights and contemporary Christian teachings).
43. See generally DANIEL DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE (Thomas Keyner ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2007) (1719) (recounting the fictional title character’s years spent marooned
on a remote tropical island).
44. See DANIEL DEFOE, THE FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES OF THE FAMOUS MOLL
FLANDERS (Bibliophilist Society 1931) (1722). For a cultural understanding of Moll
Flanders as applied to law, see NICOLA LACEY, WOMEN, CRIME, AND CHARACTER: FROM
MOLL FLANDERS TO TESS OF THE D’URBERVILLES 52–53 (2008), which examines how
autonomy was recognized within social understandings of the feminine and the criminal.
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Lockean view is an individualistic one, emphasizing ownership with the
interests of nonowners as subsidiary. Although the provisos provide
some limit on ownership, for reasons I explain in the following subpart,
they do not serve to constrain concentration of ownership or to recognize
that the social relationship to material objects is one of use and
governance. Although the Lockean view supports proprietary ownership
over nature, a social view of property rights would support a model of
stewardship and social obligation. In a world that originates from
Locke’s story, the locus of economic, political, and social decisionmaking
is the individual property owner. Under a model of stewardship, the
locus is in the political institutions that society creates to determine and
structure property rights. The Lockean view posits individual discretion
as the basis for decisionmaking; the stewardship model constructs and
sharpens mechanisms for governance.
The stewardship view is not inconsistent with property ownership. It
is a model, however, that recognizes that some people are not owners
and that ownership is not equally allocated. But it is not a model that
denies the value of ownership—it places ownership in its proper place
within a scheme of social values. The stewardship model is my starting
point, and I present it here briefly by way of contrast with Professor
Merges’s starting premises in his justification of intellectual property.
As I systematically work through the ideas in his book, I will be
contrasting the alternative stewardship model with what I will refer to as
his private ownership model. My goal is to show that with slight shifts
in emphasis, the structure of Professor Merges’s argument would
actually support a view of intellectual property that supports users and
not just creators.
B. Unlocking Users
The appeal of Locke is his identification of labor as the basis for
property. Labor as a concept has appeal because of its connotation of
activity, engagement, and productivity. By contrast, the word user
sounds negative. A user is a free rider, a squatter, someone who takes
without giving, a consumer. Looking beyond the rhetoric that accompanies
the words, however, one can see an affinity between labor and use. One
who labors makes use of resources and tools to generate something new.
A user, analogously, can engage in labor by building on what has
already been created and thereby create something new. To that extent,
Locke’s theory of labor may well account for certain classes of users, as
Professor Merges would, I think, acknowledge in his discussion of
cumulative innovation or copyright fair use.
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The problem is that Locke’s grounding of property rights in labor
ignores certain normative questions that are critical to property theory in
general and intellectual property rights in particular. First, not all labor
is treated the same, and the question remains how much labor is
sufficient to establish property rights. This question indicates that there
is something more than labor as the foundation for property. Second,
Locke provides a theory of property but not of markets. This point is an
ironic one, especially because Locke is viewed as foundational for
capitalism.45 But markets cannot be reduced to labor, which is just one
factor in the success and vitality of markets. Other constituencies, such
as consumers, are necessary for the success of markets. These other
constituencies broadly constitute the users I have been referring to in this
Article. I will turn to each of these points in unlocking the user from
within the foundational principles Professor Merges has identified.
How much and what kind of labor is required to obtain property
rights? Those, like Professor Merges, who start from a Lockean
foundation for property, have a specific normative view of labor. It is
productive, value-adding, a mixture of sweat and intellect. Presumably
all members of society are equally capable of participating in the mixing
of their labor with the world to acquire property. As a historical matter
and as a practical one, the picture of mixing is a highly idealized one.
Of course, not everyone is capable, but nonetheless labor provides a
principle of desert—subject to the provisos—to explain why some have
more property than others.
But even with the provisos, the principle of desert is lacking. As a
historical matter, much property was acquired by conquest either
through warfare or some form of squatting. Settlers mixed with the land
to create communities and ownership, often appropriating from previous
occupants. In the realm of intellectual property, the sweat of an editor,
sound engineer, lab assistant, or experimental designer does not provide
a stake in the resulting copyright, patent, or trade secret. Instead, the law
requires some degree of creativity or inventiveness for intellectual
property rights to attach. 46 These requirements are not simply matters of
45. See, e.g., ELLEN MEIKSINS WOOD, THE ORIGIN OF CAPITALISM: A LONGER VIEW
109–10 (2002).
46. See, e.g., Abraham Drassinower, Sweat of the Brow, Creativity, and Authorship:
On Originality in Copyright Law, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 105, 107–08 (2003–2004);
Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV.
319, 320–21 (2008).
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administrative convenience in identifying and enforcing property rights.
They represent judgments about what types of labor count for legal
protection of rights. They are a social decision, perhaps justified by
appeal to the state of nature, but nonetheless with implications for the
decisionmaking that informs the management and commercialization of
property rights.
A focus on labor as the source of property rights, and hence social and
economic value, distorts our understanding of markets. I am not
suggesting that property rights are only about market institutions, a point
on which I elaborate in Part V. But to the extent property rights
facilitate markets and our understanding of markets shape legal rules,
like those of intellectual property, our understanding of the source of
property rights is critical. It is worth noticing that Professor Merges
ends his book with an extensive discussion of transactions as an important
curative to some of the dangers of strong property rights. Presumably,
these transactions occur in a market context.
The problem, though, is that most contemporary theories of the market
reject the labor theory of value, of which Locke provides one example.47
To be fair, Locke develops a political theory rather than an economic
one. Therefore, this criticism is directed at those who rely on Locke for
a theory of property rights and free, unregulated markets. Labor is one
factor in the marketplace. Market negotiations involve a complex set of
transactions among laborers, owners of financial assets, consumers,
managers of organizations, and stewards of natural resources. To reduce
the value that markets produce to labor is to ignore the role of
technologies, finance, taste, pure chance, and a host of other factors. All
of these factors shape the scope and influence of property rights either
directly or indirectly and consequently affect the transactions that drive
markets. Locke offers a powerful myth for property rights that is helpful
for shaping modern democracy, but is not insightful at all for what
drives market transactions.
What does unify the various actors in the marketplace as they transact
over the specific stakes held in different types of property is the concept
of use. Like the notion of labor, use is also a highly normative, loaded
concept. But the concept of use extends beyond special categories of
persons and activities. Modern theories of markets start from the
concept of use, whether described as consumption or as production.
Users engage in transactions in order to exchange and transfer resources
that others find useful according to whatever relevant personal and social
value system. Resources, by moving to higher-valued users, create

47.
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value, often disproportionate to the labor expended to create the resource.
Neither users nor laborers ultimately create value, and understanding
users is the foundational principle that should guide the construction of
property rights.
Admittedly, Locke’s theory might be relevant to understanding users.
At a conceptual level, Locke’s metaphor of mixing is one of use, broadly
construed. The shift I am suggesting is away from an idealized
assumption of productive labor, the person working the soil turning
fallow soil into fruit. Realistically, this ideal ignores that much property
was acquired through conquest or through the use of other people’s
labor: slaves, women, the indentured. Refocusing on use allows us to
rethink the normative basis of property. The normative move I am
suggesting is that property rights are created with users in mind and that
designated owners are just stewards for a broader class of users, which
consists of, among others, consumers, future generations, and constituents
that rely on property but may not have not a direct ownership stake.
Locke might support a stewardship notion of property rights. His three
provisos suggest that ownership comes with obligations. But more often
than not, Locke is used to justify a private ownership model. What I am
suggesting is that understanding labor as a type of use greatly expands
the implications of Locke.
Professor Merges paints a very positive and conventional view of
Locke that justifies property rights as well as obligations. 48 The
problem, though, is his over-idealization of labor as opposed to the
broader category of use. But a slight shift in understanding can lead to
the stewardship model of intellectual property I am advocating in this
Article. Similar shifts are relevant to his reading of Kant and Rawls,
which I turn to in the next two subparts.
C. Users and Autonomy
While Locke provides a justification for property rights based on
mixing of labor with the material world, Kant provides a foundation for
understanding the contours of autonomy of individual property rights
owners. Professor Merges turns to Kant as a source of foundational
principles, in part to explain that individual rights define autonomy but

48. See MERGES, supra note 1, at 66–67 (concluding that Locke’s theories provide
a “very good start” to understanding intellectual property).
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do not justify unfettered freedom.49 As Merges distills Kant, the right to
do something does not imply the obligation to do it. Instead, individual
autonomy is mediated within the norms that govern society. Kant and
Locke together identify individual rights tempered by social benefits and
limitations as the building block of just legal institutions.
Kant’s ideas also serve to develop a comprehensive vision of
intellectual property, one consistent with the English tradition of
empiricism and individualism and the Continental tradition of
rationalism and collective order. Like scholar Adrian Johns and others
before him,50 Merges sees in Kant’s brief writings on authorship a basis
for a moral rights approach to intellectual property, one that protects the
personality of the author as embodied in a creation and not solely the
creation as a tradable commodity. Although the basis for this moral
rights tradition is somewhat tenuous within Kant’s writings, it is
arguably consistent with his view of autonomy. Respect for individual
autonomy supports protection of a person’s private sphere or right to
withdraw from the public sphere, as well as control over how the public
intrudes into the private. Professor Merges proceeds from autonomy to
the public-private distinction to support for the right of publicity under
intellectual property law. Although he does not fully discuss the issue of
limitations, I am assuming that he would find limits on the right of
publicity grounded in right of expression, especially when the former
impedes the latter, though I may be extrapolating here from his broader
argument.
Professor Merges’s discussion of Kant follows the same structure as
his discussion of Locke. From each he distills a foundational principle
that provides a justification for intellectual property law. From Locke,
this principle is labor; from Kant, autonomy. Professor Merges shows
how each foundational principle also includes certain limiting principles
that reduce the scope of individual ownership and property rights. The
problem, however, is too much focus on individual ownership and not
enough on the uses to which property can be put.
My criticism of Merges’s application of Locke is its reduction of value
to labor and its disregard of the range of sources of value that arise from
use. Similarly, Kant is applied to support the autonomy of owners,
largely ignoring the autonomy of users. This point starts from a more
developed concept of autonomy. Individual autonomy makes no sense
separate from a conception of society. If society did not exist, then
49. See id. at 90–91 (discussing Kant’s universal principle of right and human
autonomy).
50. ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG
TO GATES 54–55 (2009).
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autonomy would not be an issue. An individual would be unconstrained
and, like Robinson Crusoe, free to roam and build on his own island.
Autonomy is necessary only when society arises, and autonomy’s
contours make sense only against a background of social relationships
and roles.51 When an individual acts in the role of parent, spouse,
teacher, student, attorney, client, or any of the number of roles one may
occupy, the individual is not acting autonomously but rather within a
network of relationships. It is only when one is not in one of these roles
that one can be truly deemed autonomous. We can debate whether
autonomy is foreground or background, and largely debates about
privacy and property are precisely about that debate. My point though is
that autonomy is relevant only within a particular understanding of
social relationships.
This point is relevant to emphasize that to focus on the autonomy of
ownership is a normative choice Professor Merges has made. He makes
it for obvious reasons, but one could just as readily begin with the
autonomy of users and make that the foreground in understanding the
scope of intellectual property rights. To illustrate this point, consider an
everyday activity like surfing the Internet. At some level, this is not an
autonomous activity. As a surfer, I am implicitly engaging with others
within a set of institutions that society has created. My ability to read
without being subject to surveillance or to blog without fear of claims of
infringement does implicate my autonomy. The question is, should we
address the autonomy of the user by taking the autonomy of the owner
as the foreground and other rights as subsidiary or should we make the
user’s autonomy the trump card? Professor Merges assumes the former,
perhaps based on a connection between ownership and innovation or
other social benefits. But this argument ignores the benefits of the latter
alternative.
How do we choose between the autonomy of owners and users?
Perhaps other foundational principles can guide us. But working within
Kant’s ideas, one solution may stem from his categorical imperative.
Under this imperative, a person should act according to that maxim
which is generalizable to other people. The imperative is an appeal to
reciprocity and to fair and equitable treatment. In my example, there are

51.

See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE,
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 15–24 (2012) (analyzing how the self and
personal autonomy are constructed within technological and social contexts).
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two competing imperatives. The first is to defend your property rights
because you would want others to defend theirs against you. The second
is to allow uses because you would want others to allow you to make
similar uses. Which of these imperatives is more rational depends in
part on the consequences. The first may lead to strong property rights
with energies extended to enforcing rights. The second may lead to a
blurring of lines between owner and user. But beyond the predicted
consequences is the broader question of which is more generalizable,
being an owner or being a user? This question is never addressed by
Professor Merges in his analysis of Kant,52 but I think it is the question
that contemporary intellectual property requires us to consider.
In short, autonomy as a concept, like that of labor, is important for
justifying intellectual property. But each concept, I would argue, ignores
relevant criteria for what we might expect from an intellectual property
system. Perhaps one thing that is missing is a sense of social justice
with an overemphasis on individualism. Professor Merges recognizes
this point because the third source of the foundational principles is
distributive justice, as presented by John Rawls. But as I argue in the
next subpart, the appeal to Rawls also suffers from ignoring the broader
category of users and overemphasizing owners.
D. Maximin and the Difference Between Users and Creators
Rawls’s theory of justice provides the third foundational principle for
Professor Merges’s justification of intellectual property. Rawls serves
two purposes. The first is to justify intellectual property rights as a basic
freedom that society should recognize. The second is to justify
intellectual property rights under a principle of fairness as providing
benefits to the worst-off members of society. As to the first purpose,
Merges appeals to intellectual property rights in protecting the liberty of
creative professionals, those individuals who produce innovative works
that benefit society as a whole. Merges makes the point that intellectual
property rights are necessary in order to provide the proper incentives
for creative professionals to produce and distribute works. He then
makes the point that the worst off in society benefit from these new
works because of the entertainment, education, and information they
provide. From these Rawlsian criteria of liberty and equity, Merges

52. See MERGES, supra note 1, at 100–01 (discussing right of publicity as consistent
with Kantian autonomy but not discussing questions that arise in use of publicity for artistic
expression).
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devises a multilayer model of intellectual property rights with the private
incentive at the core and the social benefits at the periphery.53
Professor Merges relies on Rawls to develop a distributive justice
rationale for intellectual property rights. Although perhaps implicit in
Merges’s exposition of Locke and Kant, his invocation of Rawls also
introduces a social dimension to the understanding of property rights;
I criticized his lack of discussion on this social dimension earlier in this
Article. The first part of Merges’s argument is largely a standard
incentives-based explanation for intellectual property rights. The second
part, which directly implicates the argument for distributive justice, is
more problematic.
To illustrate the second part of his argument, Professor Merges uses
the example of J.K. Rowling, who was able to rise from a state of
poverty to one of wealth through her Harry Potter series.54 Copyright
played a role in this rise, and Merges points to Rowling’s success as an
illustration of how intellectual property rights can serve creative
professionals and aid in their advancement. Merges uses the example of
Rowling to show how intellectual property rights are not a purely private
right. Rowling’s success was a function not only of her own initiative
and talent, but also of the social background and institutions that made
her rise possible. Because of this social dimension of the property right,
Merges argues that the state has the right to tax Rowling’s earnings.
Through taxation, society recaptures the social benefits from Rowling’s
work.
When I first started to read Professor Merges’s account of J.K.
Rowling as an example of intellectual property rights and distributive
justice, I thought the example would end with a discussion of her dispute
with a fan who had created an unauthorized Harry Potter encyclopedia.
The fan was found to be a copyright infringer. Although Professor
Merges does not directly address the infringement suit in his book, he
did discuss it briefly during workshops at Notre Dame Law School and
the University of San Diego School of Law. As I recall, he pointed out
that J.K. Rowling is fairly generous in licensing her work. Her practice
was an example of how intellectual property owners can waive their
rights and engage in transactions to ensure that users have access to
protected works. I use the example of the dispute between Rowling and
53.
54.

Id. at 121–23.
Id. at 133–35.
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the fan to illustrate how Rawlsian approaches to distributive justice
inform the initial entitlements of intellectual property owners with
respect to potential users.
Professor Merges distills Rawls’s theory of distributive justice down
to three principles that have application to intellectual property.55 The
three principles are (1) distribution of liberties; (2) distribution of
opportunities; and (3) equal respect for persons.56 Under the first two
principles, intellectual property ownership is available to everyone who
meets the legal requirements. The requirements themselves are arguably
egalitarian and not exclusionary. Although the first two principles offer
relatively straightforward bases for identifying the fairness of intellectual
property, the third is more controversial and difficult. I will spend most
of my discussion on this third point as a basis for identifying distributive
justice in intellectual property law without contesting the first two
principles.
Rawls’s principle of equal respect for persons is known as the
difference principle. Rawls recognizes that rights and resources will be
distributed unequally in society.57 Nonetheless, rights and resources can
be distributed in a just manner. The principle of justice he proposes is
basing differences on maximizing the least well-off in society. In
choosing among alternative social arrangements, society should choose
that arrangement which improves the well-being of the worst off in
society. Professor Merges adopts the difference principle as assuring the
fairness of intellectual property rights.58 He argues that intellectual
property rights ensure not only equal distribution of rights and
opportunities, but also the well-being of the worst off. J.K. Rowling
serves as his poster child for this last point.59 Impoverished but creative,
Rowling parlayed her creative energies into enormous wealth, made
possible by the copyrights in her novels. Intellectual property ownership
can maximize the well-being of the poorest in society.
The Rowling example arguably overstates the case for intellectual
property ownership. Of course, not all intellectual property owners, or
property owners for that matter, are as successful as J.K. Rowling.
Legal rights do not guarantee success. But Professor Merges’s point is
that legal rights do make success possible. Fairly distributed legal rights
in turn guarantee equality of opportunity for everyone. The problem is
that the Rawlsian argument offers little guidance for the scope of

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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intellectual property rights, a question that is critical for distributive
justice. If intellectual property owners have strong rights that permit the
enjoining of incremental creators or the activities of users, then there is a
question of the fairness of the scope of intellectual property rights. If a
fan of Rowling wants to create a new work, a website, or a new form of
fiction that uses elements of Rowling’s works, should the fan be allowed
to do this without a license from Rowling? Where do the owner’s rights
end and the user’s rights begin?
To examine the scope issues, consider the fan fiction example in
Rawlsian terms. The discussion below is based on an example by John
Broome, as discussed by Derek Parfit in his critique of the difference
principle.60 For this example, reduce the possibilities to two possible
states of the world, one in which the fan is an infringer and the
alternative in which the fan is not an infringer. In State 1, Rowling earns
1,000 units of joy and the fan earns −500 units. In State 2, Rowling
earns 750 units and the fan 300 units. These units are used to illustrate
the example; if it helps, think of them as ordinal measures of utility. To
summarize this information:
State 1 (infringement): Rowling, 1,000 units; Fan, −500 units
State 2 (no infringement): Rowling, 750 units; Fan, 300 units
Which is more desirable from a Rawlsian perspective? The discussion
below is also derived from an example by Broome, as discussed by
Parfit.61
Note first that from an efficiency standpoint, the two states are
noncomparable because Rowling is worse off in State 2 while the fan is
better off. Assuming that units are nonadditive because they represent
subjective weights, it makes no sense to add the units of joy. Therefore,
from an efficiency perspective, we cannot compare them without some
criterion to compare the two individuals’ levels of joy. But the Rawlsian
perspective is to make the worst-off group the best-off. That is the
meaning behind the “maximin principle”—maximizing the minimum
well-being in society. If our choice is between these two states of the
world, then State 2 satisfies the Rawlsian criterion for equity. The fan is
worse off than Rowling in both states, but is better-off in State 2 than in
State 1.
60.
61.

See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 491–93 (1984).
Id. at 492.
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I raise this example to show how an argument about intellectual
property rights and distributive justice must adequately take into
consideration users like the fan in this case. Professor Merges recognizes
the social aspect of intellectual property rights but fails, in my opinion,
to fully account for all the social uses of intellectual property. My
example shows that there is one social use that might justify limited
intellectual property rights. It should not be read to mean that
intellectual property rights should be limited against all uses.
To see this point, consider another stylized example. Suppose the user
just makes unauthorized copies of all of Rowling’s works with a
scanner. In State 1, the copier is an infringer and enjoys −500 units
while Rowling enjoys 1,000 units. In State 2, the copier is not an
infringer and enjoys 1,000 units while Rowling enjoys −750 units. The
information can be summarized as follows:
State 1 (infringement): Rowling, 1,000 units; Copier, −500 units
State 2 (no infringement): Rowling, −750 units; Copier, 1,000 units
This example is difficult because neither Rowling nor the copier is
clearly the worst off. Rowling is the worse off in State 2 and the copier
in State 1. The maximin principle states that the goal is to maximize the
well-being of the worst off. In this situation, State 1 satisfies Rawls’s
criterion because the worse off in State 1 is better off than the worse off
in State 2, in relative terms.
These stylized examples illustrate Rawls’s criteria for distributive
justice and the importance of identifying and including use in analyzing
the scope of intellectual property rights from a distributive justice
perspective. The difference between the two examples is the degree of
infringement. In the first example, the fan infringes on the derivative
work right only, leaving Rowling several avenues through which to
exploit her work. In the second example, the copier is engaging in more
intensive infringement, with the copying affecting a range of markets for
Rowling’s work.
Considerations of use, as these examples show, affect the scope of
intellectual property rights. Professor Merges’s analysis, by contrast,
derives from Rawls a justification for intellectual property ownership
without considering users. Admittedly, he concludes that ownership is
subject to social interests, but it is not clear from his analysis how such
limitations would work. My examples show that the limitations can be
quite complex and dependent on context. More importantly, the
examples demonstrate how users’ rights need to be considered along
with ownership rights for the distributive justice analysis.
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A criticism of my analysis is that it assumes the work has been created
and therefore ignores the incentives and claims of owners who make the
original work. In partial response, I incorporate by reference my
discussion of the ex nihilo condition from Part II above.62 As explained
in Part II, the analysis does not change if one understands these
examples in terms of the decision of whether to create a work or to
become a fan. The point is not to conclude that there should no property
rights in Rowling’s work. Rather, my point is that the scope of
intellectual property rights is based on considering the interest of
potential users of a work. The Rawlsian approach to distributive justice
assumes a relative conception of who is the worst off in society. Making
this determination more absolute requires an appeal to other criteria such
as wants, needs, or capacities. Although many intellectual property
scholars are working on what these criteria should be, my point here is
that Rawls alone may not be helpful in developing a distributive justice
approach to intellectual property. Furthermore, as Professor Merges’s
analysis implies, relying on Rawls alone may lead to intellectual property
law and policy that is more favorable to owners than to users.
E. Summary
Foundational principles, because they are at such a high level, can be
used to justify any position. My argument in this Part has been that
Professor Merges’s foundational principles for intellectual property
rights do not adequately take into consideration the rights of users or the
concept of use. Merges presents a deontic argument in favor of the rights
of creative people. Although critical of wealth maximization and
utilitarianism, his argument in favor of creative people is implicitly a
utilitarian one that entails putting greater weights on creators and users.
This Part has made the case for users as an important but ignored class
of people in Merges’s analysis. Why users matter will become clearer as
I turn first to Professor Merges’s midlevel principles and then to the
practice of intellectual property.

62. See supra Part II.B.1; see also SUNDER, supra note 8, at 126–44 (discussing the
role of intellectual property in helping the poor).
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IV. MIDLEVEL PRINCIPLES AND UBIQUITOUS USERS
Professor Merges’s defense of intellectual property is a healthy and
pragmatic one in that it brings together many values and perspectives.
The thrust of my critique is to shift the emphasis of his multivalent
approach. Instead of emphasizing creative people as the beneficiaries of
intellectual property law, my emphasis is on users. Instead of building
intellectual property law on the foundational principle of labor, I seek to
emphasize use, very broadly construed, as the organizing principle for
intellectual property law. By focusing on use, I do not mean to
shortchange authors and inventors, but to include a wide range of
constituencies who benefit from intellectual property law. Creative
people, in my view, are a subset of users, whose interests need to be
considered along with consumers, public-minded institutions such as
libraries and universities, and other groups who are caught in the web of
intellectual property policy and practice.
The role of users is particularly important with respect to the midlevel
principles that Professor Merges identifies to structure intellectual
property institutions and bridge the divide between foundational theories
and intellectual property practice. These midlevel principles are, in
order discussed: nonremoval, efficiency, dignity, and proportionality.
Although these principles are couched in terms of creative people,
hidden within each principle is a collection of user interests that need to
be disentangled and understood discretely. Like the previous Part, this
one brings out the contours of users’ interests and attempts to integrate
them into a fuller understanding of intellectual property.
Professor Merges, of course, does recognize users’ interests in
intellectual property policy. Specifically, in the chapters on midlevel
principles, Professor Merges analyzes the borderline between users and
creative people. He points out that within intellectual property institutions,
there are core rights of creative persons and core rights of users.
However, he correctly points out that there is also a sphere in which
creative persons waive their rights, for example, by giving content away
for free or through generous licensing terms. Merges also recognizes a
sphere where rights of creative persons do not reach because of
technological restrictions. Digital technologies, particularly the Internet,
have expanded the sphere of rights waived by creative persons and
shrunk the core rights of users. Professor Merges suggests that the core
rights of creative persons have also shrunk.
Social and technological changes that arise with new institutions like
the Internet certainly affect the balance of rights within intellectual
property. My main disagreement with Professor Merges’s analysis of
the dynamic among users and creators is the lack of specificity in how
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this dynamic works. In many ways, the core rights of creators have
expanded with the new technologies as they can more effectively lock
access through encryption and other technologies. Infringement may be
more ubiquitous, but is also easier to detect. As the Internet expands, the
zone of private space free from intrusion by intellectual property law
contracts. Users have to worry more about access to information, ability
to share knowledge, and ownership over content. The need to focus on
the interests of users becomes more salient. Hence, the orientation of
this critique from creator-centric to user-centric.63
As with the previous Part, I look at each of the midlevel principles
individually and then conclude with an integrated focus on users’ rights.
A. Nonremoval
The nonremoval principle states that once work is in the public
domain, free of intellectual property rights, the work will not be
removed from the public domain.64 The principle reflects the working
principle that intellectual property is of limited duration and defaults to
the public upon the termination of the rights. Professor Merges lists the
principle, but it is of lesser importance than the other three. His
treatment of the principle is consistent with his creator-focused view of
intellectual property rights.
Professor Merges’s book and his argument preceded the Supreme
Court’s decision in Golan v. Holder, which was announced in January
2012.65 In that decision, the Court upheld Congress’s rights to restore
copyrights in non-U.S. works that had not secured U.S. copyrights
because of failure to comply with legal formalities.66 Because U.S.
copyright law had imposed formalities that other nations did not,
Congress implemented the restoration as a condition for the United
States acceding to international intellectual property treaties. Some
commentators expected the Court to uphold the statute despite a
challenge based on the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.
This expectation was based on the Court’s 2003 decision in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, which upheld Congress’s power to extend the copyright term

63.
64.
65.
66.

See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 8, at 352.
See MERGES, supra note 1, at 141–42.
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 873 (2012).
Id. at 878.
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retroactively by twenty years.67 What may have been surprising was the
breadth of the Court’s opinion in Golan. The Court stated that neither
the Copyright Clause nor the First Amendment limit Congress’s power
to remove works from the public domain. The breadth of the Court’s
ruling is in conflict with any reasonable interpretation of the nonremoval
principle.
Perhaps Professor Merges de-emphasizes the nonremoval principle
because it is seemingly less important than the other three principles.
A decision like Golan, however, is a reminder of how important the
principle is. The Court in Golan recognized quite a broad power in
Congress to take things out of the public domain. Combined with its
ruling in Eldred, the Court sees Congress as having broad powers to
limit the entry of works into the public domain through expiration of the
copyright term. Nonremoval is violated both directly through Golan and
indirectly through Eldred.
We can only speculate how Professor Merges would respond to the
Golan decision. Perhaps the response would rest in one of the other
principles, such as proportionality. Certainly, nonremoval would not be
a trump on all congressional legislation that shifts the line between
proprietary and public domain. For example, in the Golan case, the
Court could have upheld the statute on very narrow grounds such as a
condition for international negotiations or as compensation for past
creators who had been denied copyright. As with any principle, the
nonremoval principle is a negotiable one. The challenging question is
determining on what terms the principle can be sacrificed and what
interest and rights are being traded off in the process. The Court’s
decision in Golan, by positing congressional power in such broad terms,
seemingly concedes that there is very little given up through copyright
restoration.
Even more telling is the way in which the Court construes the public
interest affected by Congress’s legislation. As the Court frames it, the
public had no vested rights in the public domain works whose copyrights
were restored. The archaic language of vested rights demonstrates that
the Court sees copyright solely in ownership terms. Because by
definition works in the public domain are not owned by anyone, there
could be no vested rights.68 But there may be interests other than ones of
ownership. The Court pays little attention to reliance interests of users.
Admittedly, the challenged statute did protect the interests of derivative

67.
68.
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rights creators. But the interests of teachers and conductors like Golan
are given no weight in the Court’s analysis.
The Golan decision reflects our poverty as policymakers in adequately
accounting for the interests of users in shaping intellectual property and
policy. The Court’s use of the vested rights language indicates that they
see intellectual property rights in terms of owners and nonowners, with
scant consideration for the range of use to which works can be put.
A more detailed and careful understanding and respect for users may not
help to avoid decisions like Golan, but can at least enrich our
justification for intellectual property law and support a more practical
and robust nonremoval principle.69 It is decisions like Golan that make
me critical of a creator-centered intellectual property law.
B. Efficiency, Dignity, and Proportionality
I will discuss the remaining three midlevel principles together because
they share certain features and taken together show the problem of
ignoring users’ interests in a justification for intellectual property.
Professor Merges views proportionality as the most important of all four
midlevel principles. His discussion of nonremoval is directed at publicdomain-centered scholars. His discussion of efficiency and dignity
highlights the dual role of both utilitarian and moral rights views of
intellectual property, even though they are sometimes seen as mutually
exclusive. Finally, the proportionality principle directs the attention of
policymakers and scholars to gauging the proper scope of intellectual
property rights and therefore is the most powerful of the four principles,
in Professor Merges’s account.
These three midlevel principles also point to the importance of
users’ interests in intellectual property rights. For example, efficiency
requires a weighing of competing benefits and costs associated with
intellectual property rights, whether gauged in wealth-maximizing or
consequentialist terms. In determining whether intellectual property law
is wealth maximizing or has desirable consequences, a policymaker has
to consider the effect of the law on the uses to which copyrighted,
patented, and trademarked works are put. These uses include followon creation and cumulative innovation as well as the effects on

69. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 347–48 (discussing minimal role of users’ interests
in defining intellectual property law).
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consumers of products embodying intellectual property. Focusing solely
on consequences to creative persons or on the wealth of this group
without also considering the benefits to users would be an incomplete
efficiency analysis.
As Professor Merges would admit, considerations of efficiency
demonstrate that his approach to intellectual property law is not purely a
deontic one. Utilitarianism, perhaps invariably, creeps back in. But
efficiency in his analysis is a midlevel principle, a pragmatic means of
bridging foundational principles and the applications of intellectual
property to practice. Dignity is also a critical midlevel principle
highlighting the deontic aspects of his approach. A criticism of Merges’s
justification is that it attempts to blend the incompatible ends of
utilitarianism and moral rights, the first seeking to maximize the wealth
generated by intellectual property and the second, the personal rights of
the creator. But, as Professor Merges develops the arguments, efficiency
and dignity are compatible in protecting the autonomy of creative
individuals with the first supporting economic interests and the second
noneconomic ones.70
But dignity, like efficiency, also implicates the interests of groups
other than creators, groups that I have been referring to in broad terms as
users. If the dignity principle recognizes an autonomous sphere to which
legal rights attach, then the autonomy of a user is as important as that of
a creator. This autonomous sphere, for example, would include the right
to enjoy a work quietly in the private sphere. The dignity of a user
would include the right to engage in private home copying, studying, or
research. It would include the dignity of a patient to be subject to
treatment without the intrusion of a medical patent and the dignity of a
medical practitioner to appropriately treat a patient within the sphere of
professional judgment. A complete and consistent application of the
dignity principle would require recognizing the interests of users.
These points underscore the fourth, and most important, of Professor
Merges’s midlevel principles, proportionality. Merges invokes this
pragmatic principle as a means to avoid the holdup problem that arises in
many areas of the law. A holdup occurs when an individual rights holder
can block a project and thereby extract much of the benefit from the
public benefits following from the project. Professor Merges gives the
example of a bridge project stopped by property owners near the water.71
Law has many ways to deal with these holdups. Intellectual property
70. See MERGES, supra note 1, at 156–58 (presenting dignity as a midlevel principle
and as sharing features with other principles); see also SUNDER, supra note 8, at 173–99
(demonstrating the implications of intellectual property for matters of life and death).
71. MERGES, supra note 1, at 162–65.
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law deals with the holdup problem through doctrines such as limitations
on injunctive relief, implementation of compulsory licenses, and
doctrines such as fair use or implied license. These legal regimes are
based on the proportionality principle, which states that the return to the
property owner has to be proportional to the benefit provided by the
owner. This principle is different from that of efficiency, which applies
to the total benefits and costs of a legal regime. Proportionality is
targeted to the scope of the rights holder’s entitlement. What is at issue
under this fourth principle is a comparison of the benefit to the rights
holder and the benefit to society.
How is proportionality to be gauged? In practice, courts look to the
value of enjoining the defendant’s infringing conduct under the traditional
common law approach to injunctive relief.72 Damage measures also
serve as proxies for proportionality. But these are rough heuristics at best.
Applying the proportionality principle more rigorously requires an
assessment of what users gain from access and lose from infringement.
Implicit in the principle is an acknowledgement of users and their
interests. This acknowledgement means that in some situations the
interests of users will trump those of creators. But for this principle to
have practical effect, the interests of users need to be better understood.
As with other midlevel principles, users need to be considered to make
the principle complete and effective in guiding intellectual property law
and policy.
C. Midlevel Principles and Users
Professor Merges’s focus on creative persons has a certain visceral
appeal. Creative persons create something new and bring works into the
world ex nihilo. Consequently, their efforts should be encouraged. But
that argument proves too much. At some level, all social actors create ex
nihilo. Real estate developers build malls where none existed. City
resource managers produce parks and recreational facilities that did not
previously exist. Contract attorneys make deals that did not exist before.
No one would seriously use these novel creations as a basis for
intellectual property rights in these areas. What ultimately justifies
72. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006); see also
Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV.
175, 194 (2011) (discussing equitable framework prescribed by the Court to determine
whether to grant injunctive relief against a patent infringer).
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intellectual property is the use to which such new works will be put.
This formulation is not merely instrumentalism. The uses may reflect
basic human needs such as health care or education. They may reflect
pure enjoyment or aesthetic pleasure. They may be industrial or they
may be noncommercial. As I have argued, Professor Merges’s justification
for intellectual property, although creator-centered, hinges implicitly on
these often unrecognized users’ interests. In the next and penultimate
Part, I show the implications users have on the implementation and
practice of property rights.
V. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: STABILITY,
MANAGEMENT, AND AUTONOMY
Professor Merges concludes his justification with three lengthy and
detailed examples that illustrate how his identified foundational and
midlevel principles would apply in practice. His three examples are of
the growth in the creative professional class, the growth of digital works
and rights, and the market for life-saving pharmaceuticals.73 These
examples illustrate his creator-centered justification based on the
principles discussed above. In this Part, I will not address Professor
Merges’s examples directly. Instead, I will focus on the social benefits
of property rights systems in general. I identify three social benefits:
stability, management, and autonomy. I will show how each of these
benefits shape the legal regime of real property and contrast the role of
these benefits in shaping intellectual property. This contrast highlights
the practical aspects of intellectual property law and the principles
underlying the law. The contrast will elaborate on the theme of this
Article, that users need to be considered in designing intellectual
property systems.
A. Stability
Property law provides a means to ensure stability in human lives. This
statement is true of all legal rules to a certain extent. Contract law
shapes stability of transactional planning. Tort law provides some
degree of stability in risk management. But a key practical aspect of a
working and robust regime of property law is to promote stability of
ownership and of identity that serves as the foundation for other areas of
law.74 For example, real property law provides stability with respect to

73. See MERGES, supra note 1, at 195–287.
74. See Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1897, 1899–900 (2007).
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land. This stability gives owners assurances that allow them to build on
and improve parcels and market them. Stability of land ownership
provides assurances for most human interactions. As simple an institution
as an address system is made possible by the stability of real property
law. An address system in turn makes it possible to trace individuals
and identify them for purposes of contract enforcement, debt collection,
imposition of criminal or tort liability, enforcement of marital and other
social obligations, and so on. I am not suggesting that real property is
either necessary or sufficient for stability. The point is that a practical
implication of a real property system is stability, which can be the basis
for transactions and human interactions in a wide range of contexts.
Stability is a consequence of the foundational and midlevel principles
highlighted by Professor Merges. For a Lockean theory of property
rights to work, a person must be assured that the application of labor to
the world will be respected by others and that the fruits of labor will not
be immediately expropriated. By creating stability, real property law
reinforces the types of investment of labor Locke claims are the basis for
property rights. Similarly, stability is a consequence of the midlevel
principle of efficiency. An efficient, wealth-maximizing system of
property is reinforced by stable property relationships, and in turn
efficient arrangements can support stability. As a practical value, stability
follows from foundational and midlevel principles and reinforces them.
By analogy to real property systems, intellectual property also benefits
from the practical value of stability. Identifying owners of intellectual
property interests facilitates transactions. Stable ownership systems
benefit users by allowing them to identify the source of works and to
engage in transactions guided by branded products and services and
identified creators and inventors. Professor Merges’s justification for
intellectual property parallels the logic of real property law by identifying
the similarities. One important similarity is the practical value of stability.
But what often matters are the differences, not the similarities.
Although stability is perhaps a virtue in intellectual property systems,
intellectual property itself is about change. Promoting progress, to echo
the U.S. Constitution, may have many meanings, but one implication is
that of disruption.75 Stability as a practical value is in tension with the
75. For a business management perspective on progress and disruption, see David
J. Teece et al., Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 509 (1997). For a legal, historical, and linguistic analysis of the meaning of progress,
see Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed To Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article
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change that intellectual property law is supposed to promote. This tension
is apparent throughout intellectual property case law and throughout
intellectual property history. New technologies challenge traditional
business practices, to which intellectual property owners respond using
copyrights or patents as a sword to prevent change. At the same time,
innovators develop technologies and use intellectual property rights to
license and transfer new devices and methods. The resolution of this
tension may reside outside of intellectual property law, perhaps in the
evolution of the marketplace, in social norms, in human behavior that
emerges out of the shadow of the law. Nonetheless, to emphasize stability
through analogy to real property ignores the reality of the disruption,
both positive and negative, created by intellectual property. Rights
owners seek stability to counter change that destabilizes existing social
arrangements and expectations.
If one accepts stability as a practical value for a system of property,
then how does one reconcile the dual status of stability within intellectual
property law? How can stability be a virtue that does not undermine the
important goal of change? One way to do so and be consistent with the
foundational and midlevel principles we have discussed is to find
stability within intellectual property law in the manner in which change
occurs. Stability within intellectual property is not about fixed addresses
or relationships between owner and object. Instead, stability is found in
the process through which these addresses and relationships change.
That is the contested question.
Some may argue that the process should be through licensing and
market transactions.76 Others may argue that the process is the modes of
creation and invention that intellectual property law makes possible.77
The reality is that the process of change is a multidimensional one,
captured perhaps metaphorically by the image of labor mixing with the
world. But such a quaint image belies the range of human interactions
and activities that add up to change. I have called humans engaged in
these interactions and activities “users” in this Article. To understand
the practical value of stability in intellectual property law, it is important

I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause,
80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001).
76. See, e.g., MERGES, supra note 1, at 309–10.
77. See, e.g., Roberta R. Kwall, The Lessons of Living Gardens and Jewish Process
Theology for Authorship and Moral Rights, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 889 (2012)
(emphasizing the importance of authorship); Mark P. McKenna, Introduction, Creativity
and the Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1819 (2011) (introducing a symposium focusing
on intellectual property law’s promotion of creativity).
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for us to more fully appreciate how users of intellectual property operate.
And as I have emphasized, these users are not only or always owners.78
B. Management
Stability is a practical value arising from property, but is in tension
with intellectual property’s goal of promoting change. I have suggested
how the tension can be resolved by attention to questions of use rather
than solely on ownership. A similar point arises from the second
practical role of property, to facilitate management. Recognizing
property as a legal matter provides incentives and creates assurances for
managing the item owned. Absent property rights, individuals would
have incentives to abandon an item once it became too costly to maintain
or once its economic returns became negative. With property rights,
individuals can transfer ownership to a more valued use or invest more
intensively into developing the item owned. Management might often
be for personal gain, but given the incentives, management can also
occur for public benefit such as might occur for shared resources like
water or a park. Stability allows for planning and supports the
management of property.
As for intellectual property, management is an important practical
value. But often it is framed solely in questions of individual returns and
private gains. This framing, I would argue, flows from a sterile view of
the goals and purpose of intellectual property. This view sees
intellectual property solely as a private reward or a private incentive.
Management within this frame is about extracting as many rents as
possible from the licensing and sale of the intellectual property.
However, management also entails protecting public benefits. The
owner of intellectual property is a temporary one, with the protected
work eventually going back to the public. An intellectual property
owner is a steward. The challenging question is reconciling this
stewardship role with self-interest. Doctrines that create limitations and
exceptions to intellectual property rights can go only so far. At some
point rules external to intellectual property need to come into play to
promote the stewardship role of the temporary intellectual property
owner. To properly attend to these institutions, we need to better

78.

See supra Part III.A.
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understand the uses of intellectual property and the interest of users, not
just those of owners.
An even more challenging question is the management of the public
domain. An ownership model would predict that public domain works
would be unprofitable and would be unused. That prediction is
inconsistent with empirical studies that show public domain works are
marketed, often over copyrighted works.79 At some level, there is a
logical explanation for that empirical observation. Public domain works
are free and so as a costless resource for those who need to market
creative content, the public domain is there to be mined absent property
rights. At the same time, one might expect a different market and social
dynamic shaping the public domain for patented works than that for
copyrighted works. Inventions whose patents have expired are the
previous generation’s technology, less effective presumably than what is
new. However, the patent public domain contains knowledge on which
future technologies can be built and so is not simply a rubbish bin of
technological development. My point is that management principles
apply as much to the public domain as to the proprietary realm of
intellectual property.
To appreciate that point, we need to be better tuned to users and their
needs with respect to intellectual property. Professor Merges does
acknowledge the existence of users’ rights, although he does not clearly
state their content and scope. Instead, he sees them as part of the
negative space of what the owner is not given under intellectual property
laws and what is waived because of high enforcement costs.80 Merges’s
argument seems to be that even if owners are given a wide scope of
rights under intellectual property laws, users are protected because
enforcement costs keep these strong rights from being enforced. There
is, however, little consideration of what the substance of users’ rights
should be and whether intellectual property law grants too broad a set of
rights to owners.
Management as a practical value derives from the foundational and
midlevel principles identified by Professor Merges. The mixing of labor
as described by Locke implies managing the object appropriated.
Kantian autonomy is guided by personal management. Even the
Rawlsian veil may mandate the value of management in order to ensure

79. See, e.g., Christopher J. Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen
When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension,
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2130008.
80. See MERGES, supra note 1, at 148–49 (presenting users’ rights as residual of
owners’ rights and waiver).
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that benefits flow to the worst off in society. Nonremoval, efficiency,
dignity, and proportionality each subsume management to realize the
value of property. My concern is that these principles, too narrowly
focused on owners and without a more complete regard to users, may be
self-defeating when used to justify intellectual property. Justifying
intellectual property entails recognizing that owners are only temporary
and serve, in part, as stewards over what will constitute the public
domain.
C. Autonomy
Autonomy is a practical value that informs property law. I discussed
autonomy above in the context of Kant and the foundational principles
underlying intellectual property. In this Part, the focus is on autonomy
as a value that informs property law in practice. As a practical value,
autonomy refers to an individual’s sense of place within which he or she
can plan and develop one’s life and one’s set of relationships. The
notion of what is mine shapes and is shaped by one’s sense of identity.
The ability to cultivate one’s life and relationships is of course related to
the values of stability and management. Autonomy as a practical value
recognizes the sanctity of one’s home as a stable locus that is a zone of
the owner’s managerial discretion but also a realm of autonomy.
For intellectual property, autonomy as a practical value supports a set
of legal rights that allows the owner to develop a work without
interference from unauthorized users. This set of legal rights sanctions
the discretion of the owner and promotes the development of the
personality and the cultivation of a personal vision. Within copyright
law, autonomy as a practical value nurtures Anglo-American-style
copyright as well as moral rights. Within patent law, where the autonomous
self has play as an inventor engaged in the creation of utilitarian works,
autonomy as a practical value allows for the free play of research and
experimentation to build on prior art to develop nonobvious inventions
that can inform and teach the relevant art. While real property envisions
autonomy in spatial terms, intellectual property aids the autonomy of the
mind whether engaged in art, science, or many disciplines.
Support for autonomy as a practical value is found in the foundational
and midlevel principles Professor Merges presents. Locke’s primacy of
labor, Kant’s notion of the rational self, and Rawls’s defense of
distributive justice reinforce autonomy in defining the practice of
intellectual property. The midlevel principles also are connected to
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autonomy. Nonremoval assumes a sphere of the private that is distinct
from the public domain. Efficiency entails the balancing of private
benefits and costs to enable wealth maximization from intellectual
property. Dignity is tied to a notion of autonomous self, free from
public intrusion. Finally, the goal of proportionality is to balance rights
among selves so that each is benefitted in proportion to what is given on
to others. Intellectual property law derives from foundational and
midlevel autonomy as one of its practical ends.
But what was stated about autonomy as a foundational principle
applies to autonomy as a practical value. It is meaningless to talk about
the autonomous self as independent of society. This observation is true
in part because the self is often defined by the needs of social interaction
and relationships. It is equally true because these social interactions and
relationships shape the self and its aspirations and its yardsticks for
fulfillment. In defining property rights, whether real or intellectual, the
scope of legal protection will depend on whether the property is
commercial or noncommercial, educational or for entertainment.
Although trespass is proposed as the canonical model for property
enforcement, nuisance may be more apt. Often legal conflicts are not
about invasion or intrusion, but about conflicting uses which need to be
mediated through balancing of principles and flexible remedies. Once
again, autonomy, like the other practical values of property, is gauged
not solely in terms of ownership, but also in terms of use. Focusing
solely on the autonomy of creators as owners ignores the autonomy of
users.
Autonomy both as foundational and as practice value assumes the
natural person. But a category conflict arises when ownership can be in
the hands of a corporate entity. To speak of the autonomy of a
corporation, a legal fiction designed to allocate risk and manage wealth,
is to confuse and blur over values that are human and personal. When
intellectual property is held by business entities, to what extent is
autonomy a value that the law should recognize? Unfortunately, this is a
question that Professor Merges does not adequately address. He seems
to view owners as creative professionals and assume business entities
that acquire intellectual property do so by compensating the professionals
fully.81 Autonomy values in intellectual property are meaningful even
when a corporate entity is the owner because the creative professional
has been compensated in the transaction of transferring rights. This is
how I construe the implicit argument, and I disagree with it. Not only is
adequate compensation unlikely, but rights used by corporate entities

81.
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may also be very different from rights held by natural persons.82 They
operate in different spheres and on different terms. Once again, focusing
solely on ownership and not on its context, particularly the interests of
users, leaves out much in the analysis. Autonomy is an important
principle and practical value, but it should be understood in broad terms
rather than in narrow ones of ownership.
D. Contrasts and Implications
In this Part, I introduce three practical values that are often associated
with property. These three practical values—stability, management, and
autonomy—are used to contrast real property and intellectual property as
well as to underscore my argument about users’ interests. Professor
Merges ends his book with three practical examples as well. They are
detailed discussions of creative professionals, digital rights, and
pharmaceuticals. I touched on his discussion of creative professionals
above in my exploration of autonomy as a practical value. I conclude
this Part by briefly turning to Professor Merges’s practical examples to
illustrate my understanding of his justification and my criticism that it
needs to more adequately take into consideration the interests of users.
Professor Merges has a relatively straightforward, and in my opinion
unassailable, point about intellectual property rights in the digital
environment. He expresses skepticism about weak property rights that
would support a culture of community creative and cooperative ownership.
I find this point unassailable, but also a bit of a straw man argument.
I think the point rests on a caricature. It also rests on a focus on
ownership by creative professionals that does not adequately examine
the interests of users. My argument is that users provide the missing
piece of the intellectual property policy puzzle and their needs, varied
across industries and fields of activities, must be more thoroughly
understood before we can feel confident about the direction of
intellectual property policy. Professor Merges correctly points to the
low contracting costs made possible by the digital environment. These
low contracting costs, Professor Merges argues, allow owners and users
to strike necessary deals, obviating the need for weaker intellectual
property rights.
82. See CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND
THE RISE OF CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800–1930, at 240–41 (2009) (tracing

shift from employee ownership to corporate ownership of knowledge).
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I am agnostic about whether the lowered transaction costs will yield
the desired results. While costs of communication have undoubtedly
fallen with digital technologies, the costs of information processing and
management have probably gone up. The amount of content has
increased, and users need to more carefully parse information on the
Internet partly because there is so much of it. Orphan works, and the
resulting problem of identifying owners, are just one example of how
costs may have increased or remain unchanged. Certainly digital
technologies may evolve in order to reduce these costs as well, but that
depends on whether this evolution adequately accounts for the needs and
values of users. An owner-centric perspective may not provide a full
account or guide for policy.
Professor Merges ends his book by turning to pharmaceutical patents
and access to medicines to treat life-threatening diseases.83 This chapter
is perhaps the first one in which Professor Merges fully confronts what I
have been referring to broadly as users’ interests. The context of access
to medicines allows Professor Merges to demonstrate the power of his
foundational and midlevel principles in balancing the interests of owners
against those of users. Professor Merges recommends various limitations
on pharmaceutical patents grounded in his principles of distributive
justice and proportionality. This chapter illustrates how Professor
Merges’s justification differs from traditional pro-property rights
arguments, in the vein of Robert Nozick. He shows the limits of libertarian
theories of intellectual property and demonstrates how property can be
recognized while still respecting human values. Furthermore, Professor
Merges’s consideration of patients, one class of what I call users, is a
model for the type of user-focused intellectual property policy that I
have been advocating in this Article. His analysis suggests to me that
his justification, with a shift towards users and away from creators,
might hold promise for a more robust justification of intellectual
property, one that might engage the interests of users as well as owners.
VI. BUILDING ON THE SHOULDERS OF MERGES
Professor Merges begins his book on a cautionary note, expressing
bewilderment at the sprawl of intellectual property law and policy. He
takes us through an odyssey, engaging with critical thinkers and ideas
that shape politics, economics, and law. The odyssey ends on an
optimistic note with the moorings of intellectual property restored in a
defense of intellectual property ownership tempered by transactions and
waiver. Merges’s soul-searching, a term I use in a positive way, results
83.
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in a justification for intellectual property law as he knows it. Law and
policy can go on as usual it appears.
There is a nostalgic quality to Professor Merges’s writing. He seems
to be missing something that has become lost in contemporary
intellectual property scholarship. I am not sure what he is longing for,
but I find nostalgic feelings worth noting in the field of intellectual
property with its emphasis on progress. Merges’s book seeks the old,
old thing, the core or heart of intellectual property. But this longing
reveals a loss of faith in progress. I cannot pretend to understand these
feelings because I am less skeptical that progress occurs. However,
I may just envision it differently from Professor Merges. Consequently,
my justification for intellectual property will be fundamentally distinct
from his, even though in application there may be areas of overlap.
Intellectual property is in need of justification, at least as Professor
Merges explains, because its moorings seem to be cut loose. Merges’s
justification is not only an explanation for intellectual property, but also
a correction, as with justifying or aligning text. His goal is scholarly and
reform-minded. The range of reading and thought makes the book a
truly scholarly one. However, as I demonstrated in this Article, I am
skeptical about the book’s prescriptions. Professor Merges does offer
much to digest and build on, and his ideas serve as a foil to develop a
user-focused intellectual property law.
In strengthening the moorings of intellectual property, there is
superficial attractiveness in tying rights to the interests of creative
professionals as owners. There is a certain democratic appeal in the
concept of creativity, especially if one believes that it is not tied to
accident of birth and is somewhat equally distributed in society. The
problem is that intellectual property as it is embodied in products and
services permeates society, not in a hegemonic or monopolistic way, but
in a way that affects a range of interests beyond those of owners.
Therefore, these interests need to be taken into consideration.
Professor Merges, of course, is attuned to these points, but he sees
these interests as secondary to those of owners. He sees users’ interests
being protected by waiver of rights. In some ways, users must rely on
the kindness of owners. Intellectual property licensing also saves users.
As he states in the concluding chapter, as long as transactions can occur,
the owner will utilize contract law and the market to distribute the
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benefits of intellectual property to users.84 His coda is that we need to
better understand intellectual property transactions. I would concur, but
we also need to understand that transactions are not a panacea and
markets do not spontaneously arise. In fact, the legal regime may inhibit
healthy and beneficial transactions. Intellectual property law consequently
needs to incorporate the interests of users, not simply through a balance
with owners’ interest, but through affirmative protections for users.
Intellectual property is about both owners’ rights and users’ rights, but
because owners are, as I have argued, a type of user, the perspective of
users as a whole would be the unifying policy of intellectual property
law.
Looking forward, the response to the sprawl may be simply better
management of intellectual property, perhaps along the lines Professor
Merges suggests, perhaps along the lines of my proposed alternative. In
the twentieth century, as the focus turned to managed rather than
unregulated markets, real property law spun off the field of land use,
with its emphasis on public and private mechanisms to manage the urban
sprawl. The twenty-first century may be the age of intellectual property
management and correspondingly the field of intellectual property use.
Such development may simply make the times more interesting and
more confusing in Professor Merges’s eyes. But such development
represents progress in our discipline and in the incorporation of the vast
set of interests that inform intellectual property beyond those of owners.
When we progress in that direction, intellectual property may need no
justification at all.

84.
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